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This paper exploits the long history of the minimum wage in a relatively stable developing 
economy like Colombia in order to see whether it may alleviate the living conditions of low 
income families and reduce income inequality. The paper does not only explore how the 
minimum wage may serve these purposes, but also how it may distort market outcomes to 
do so. We found significant negative minimum wage effects on both the likelihood of being 
employed and hours worked for all family members, being it stronger for women, and the 
young and less educated people. We also found a positive effect on non-head participation 
especially in families with low human capital. But, more important, we found evidence that 
the minimum wage ends up being regressive, improving the living conditions of families in 
the middle and the upper part of the income distribution with net losses for those at the 
bottom.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Colombian economy, as well as many others in Latin America, has seen in the 
recent past higher rates of unemployment, an expansion of the informal sector and an 
increase in poverty and inequality as well as a more volatile macroeconomic environment. 
As a response, important reforms have been pushed for to make the labor market more 
flexible and to bring in new tools that warrant social protection without tampering the 
efficiency brought about by market forces. One institution that seem to survive these trends 
is the minimum wage. 
Much of the empirical work on the minimum wage has focused on its impact on 
unemployment, however little work has been done to assess its distributional properties. As 
Freeman (1996) puts it “Minimum wage is not a panacea to poverty and low wages. It does 
not, in general, increase national output or the rate of growth. It redistributes income.” This 
paper explores not only how minimum wages may serve this purpose but also how it may 
distort market outcomes to do so. 
The justification for minimum wage regulation mostly comes from the intention to 
provide income support to the poor. In many developing countries, unskilled wages are a 
higher proportion of income of poor urban people than in developed countries where the 
poor are more likely to benefit from social income (Lustig and McLeod, 1997). Thus the 
minimum wage may have a relatively bigger impact in developing economies and may help 
lifting low income families out of poverty. 
Minimum wage laws are routinely used in countries with very different economic 
and social situation (Shaheed, 1994). In developing countries, minimum wage laws 
generally apply to a small formal sector and compliance is usually difficult to implement.   3
However, in Latin America, it has been found that the minimum wage has a strong 
“spill-over” effect affecting the whole wage distribution, not just those wages around the 
minimum wage. Furthermore, it does not only change the distribution of wages in the 
formal sector but also those in the informal sector, acting as a “numerary” in labor contracts 
(Maloney and Nuñez, 2000 and  Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo, 2000). 
The large potential of minimum wages to shape the wage distribution, is particularly 
marked in the Colombian case where there is a clear cliff in the wage density at the 
minimum wage shifting part of the mass below it towards higher labor incomes. However, 
there is also evidence of a large unemployment effect.  
Attempts have being done to put together employment losses and income gains in 
order to assess the net contribution of minimum wages as an institution to fight poverty. 
Most of this work has been based on simulations (Brown, 1996), although recently an 
alternative approach has been taken which looks at family incomes and poverty. This 
approach has the advantage of unifying both effects bringing forth the net effect of 
minimum wages in improving the living conditions of low income families. 
We take advantage of the long history of the minimum wage as an institution in the 
Colombian labor market by looking at the period 1984-2001 which has witnessed important 
fluctuations in the minimum wage. Using panel data for the seven largest Colombian cities 
we find a positive effect of minimum wage on family incomes although it is significant 
only for households above the 20th percentile of the family per-capita income distribution. 
For those below it, between 10th and 20th percentile, the effect is not significant. More 
important, those at the bottom of the distribution have significant losses as the likelihood of 
being poor increases with raises in minimum wages.    4
The asymmetric effect of the minimum wage along the distribution of family 
incomes generates an important distributive effect widening the distance between those 
families at the bottom of the distribution relative to the median income family. 
At the individual level, as expected, the minimum wage has a strong effect around 
the minimum but none, if not a negative effect, for those individuals below the 35th 
percentile of the individual income distribution with evidence of a spill over effect in the 
upper part that monotonically decreases toward the top. 
The strong negative effect at the bottom of the distribution of the family per-capita 
incomes as well as some indication of a negative effect for low income workers is backed 
up by strong evidence of a negative effect of the minimum wage in the likelihood of the 
household head being employed and in his/her hours worked. 
Likewise, non-head members see their hours worked reduced and their 
unemployment and participation rates increased with increases in the minimum wage. 
Furthermore, the unemployment effect for non-head members is stronger and the 
participation effect is weaker the higher the family’s human capital. 
These results confirm the predictions derived by a model of a labor market 
segmented by the minimum wage. It not only reallocates workers between the covered and 
uncovered sectors, but also increases the chances of being unemployed and distorts the 
household decisions on labor participation. Although the net welfare effect depends on 
wage elasticities, the evidence suggests that it ends up hurting the living standards of the 
poor in the Colombian case although lifting the incomes of families in the low-     middle 
and the upper part of the distribution.  
This paper is divided into 6 sections. This introduction; a discussion of the 
distributional effects of minimum wages; a review of the evidence regarding the potential   5
distributional and poverty alleviation gains that minimum wages may induce; a brief 
descriptive section of the data used; a fifth section with the results and, finally, some 
general conclusions.  
2. Redistributive Effects of Minimum Wages   
 
Freeman (1996) argues that “the redistributive effects of a minimum wage depend 
on the labor market and redistributive system in which it operates, on the level of the 
minimum and its enforcement. At best, an effective minimum wage will shift the earnings 
distribution in favor of the low-paid…at worst, minimum wages reduce the share of 
earnings going to the low-paid by displacing many from employment”. 
Theory leads to no clear predictions as to the effect of the minimum wage on 
poverty.  In the standard neoclassical model, unemployment increases if the wage is 
exogenously raised: the higher the minimum wage, the higher the cost of production and 
therefore the lower the demand for work. On the supply side, the higher the minimum wage 
the higher the potential returns to work compared to the reservation wage and, hence, the  
more the participation in the labor market.   
When a covered and an uncovered sector coexist the effect of the minimum wage 
becomes cumbersome. As Fields (1994) showed, increases in the minimum wage reduce 
employment in the covered sector. Workers loosing their jobs in this sector will either work 
in the uncovered sector or drop out of the labor force as discourage workers, pursuing some 
non-work alternatives such as school, or unpaid work, depending on their reservation wage. 
As some of them will still search for a job in the uncovered sector, the equilibrium wage 
will fall and therefore the employment level will rise in this sector. The final effect will   6
depend on the elasticity of the labor demand in the covered sector, the elasticity in the 
uncovered sector and the size of the minimum wage rise (see also Agénor and Aizenman, 
1999). 
Another possibility is the case of monopsony firms with some market power in the 
labor market which are price takers in the product market. Such market power may be the 
result of the firm being the solely employer in the market or of searching conditions. In this 
case, firms face higher marginal labor costs as they increase their demand, i.e. they face an 
upper sloping marginal cost of labor. The minimum wage flattens out this curve making it 
profitable to increase employment as the minimum raises (to a point in which it will reduce 
it).  
A model that closely mimics the predictions of the monopsony model is based on 
efficiency wage theory. The upper sloping marginal cost curve is derived from a monitoring 
technology which makes it more difficult to control individuals in the firm as the payroll 
increases. As a result, the firm uses efficiency wages to induce voluntary effort. Therefore, 
the introduction of a minimum wage might induce an increase in productivity (less 
monitoring) which will shift the demand upward and increase the equilibrium level of 
employment.
 1 
Firms can also adjust to minimum wage increases by making conditions harder for 
workers with marginal productivities below the minimum wage without necessarily firing 
them (Fraja, 1999). They could also offset the effect of the minimum wage by reducing 
non-wage compensation (Fraja, 1996). In fact, firms may prefer paying the minimum wage 
but avoiding other non-wage compulsory contributions by going informal. 
                                                 
1 See Card, D. and Krueger, A. B. (1994, 1995a, 1995b), Azam (1992) and Robbins (2002) for studies of a 
positive effect of the minimum wage on employment (the last one in the Colombian case).    7
A rise in the minimum wage may also decrease the labor supply of other members 
of the household not affected by the rise and thus contribute to the reduction of 
unemployment. It might also provide efficiency gains as the reservation wage goes up 
inducing better productivity matches between firms and workers (Basu, Genicot, and 
Stiglitz, 1999 and Teulings, 2000). 
On the other hand, minimum wages increase the income of those workers whose 
contracts are pegged to it. If the increases are concentrated in secondary earners belonging 
to families above the poverty line the minimum wage weakens as a distributional tool. 
Also, in most countries the lowest-income families usually will not have members whose 
incomes are tied to the minimum wage so it will be a poor instrument targeting the well 
being of those families.  
The income effect will depend also on “spill-over” effects of the minimum wage in 
the covered and the uncovered sector wage distributions. In Latin America, it has been 
found that the minimum wage has a strong “spill-over” effect affecting the whole wage 
distribution, not just those wages around the minimum wage. Furthermore, it not only 
changes the distribution of wages in the formal sector but also those of the informal sector, 
acting as a “numerary” in labor contracts (Maloney and Nuñez, 2001 and Neri, Gonzaga 
and Camargo, 2000). 
Finally, the extent of non-compliance practices may contradict the objective of 
equality and fairness of the minimum wage. As documented by several studies, most 
governments appear not to enforce strict compliance with minimum wages (Gindling and 
Terrell, 1995).
2 
                                                 
2 Azam (1997) suggested the positive effects of minimum wages on employment  in wheat production  could 
be explained by savings in hiring costs since the farmer  avoids non linear wages and warranty that the   8
To summarize, the following are the main forces that determine the net effect of 
minimum wages in family incomes: 
•  Some members will loose their job in the covered sector ending up unemployed with 
zero contribution to the family income;  
•  Some workers previously employed in the covered sector might find a job in the 
uncovered sector and suffer an income loss depending on wage differentials between 
sectors and “spill-over” effects; 
•  Some workers who keep their jobs in the covered sector may experience gains in their 
wages due to raises in the minimum wage. Again, the magnitude of this effect on family 
incomes will depend on whether there is an “spill-over” effect, and 
•  Some unemployed members may have longer unemployment spells as the reservation 
wage increases, some will be encourage to seek employment enter the labor, while 
others drop out of the labor force. 
 As there may be many offsetting effects of the minimum wage at the individual, 
making it hard to estimate its net effect, it makes sense to move away from individuals and 
look at family incomes to test the overall impact of minimum wages. We would expect that 
increases in the minimum wage might improve the well being of low income families if the 
employment effect of the minimum wage is small.  
2.1.  Evidence on the Redistributive Effects of Minimum Wages 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
individual will survive on it. By doing so the minimum is supported by the community who has the incentive 
to monitor compliance by other farmers. This might be the reason why a strong “spill-over effect” has been 
found in Colombia in the informal  (uncovered sector).   9
Although there are many studies that try to estimate the employment effects of 
minimum wages, only few have looked at their distributional effects. A survey by Brown 
(1996) identifies just a handful of papers dedicated to the later. Most of the empirical work 
that tries to identify the distributional effects of minimum wages has found that it is not 
very effective in helping low-income families (Newmark, 1997 and 1998). This result holds 
in part because many of the minimum-wage-paid workers belong to families that are far 
above the poverty line (Burhhauser, Couch and Wittenburg, 1996). 
The empirical work in Latin America has looked at distributional and employment 
effects separately. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1991) found strong employment effects 
in Puerto Rico after introducing the US minimum wage legislation. Bell (1997) also found 
large minimum wage elasticities of employment for workers paid near the minimum in the 
case of Colombia and Mexico using panel data on manufacturing firms. These results are 
confirm by Maloney and Nuñez (2001) who, in the Colombian case, found a significant 
positive relation between increases in the minimum wage and the likelihood of becoming 
unemployed; relationship that abates for those workers earning relatively higher wages. 
On the other hand, Maloney and Nuñez (2001) as well as Neri, Gonzaga and 
Camargo (2000) found, in the Colombian and Brazilian cases, strong positive income 
effects of changes in the minimum wage over the entire distribution of salaried workers, 
being relatively lower for those at the top, with the greatest effect occurring below the 
minimum wage showing important “spill over” effects on the wage distribution. 
As for the relation between poverty and minimum wage, the available empirical 
evidence for Latin America is mixed. Morely (1992) finds that poverty falls with a rise in 
the minimum but only for periods of recovery whereas De Janvry and Sadolet (1996) find 
minimum wage poverty alleviation in periods of recession. Using world wide LDC data,   10
Lustig  and McLeod (1996) confirm a negative effect on poverty although with a significant 
negative effect on employment.  
More recently, in a country panel for developing economies, Saget (2001) found 
that for a constant level of GDP per capita and average wage and controlling for location, a 
higher minimum wage is associated with a lower national level of poverty and concludes 
that “the data analysis gives strong support to the proposition that the minimum wage may 
bring positive results in poverty alleviation by improving the living conditions of workers 
and their families while having no negative results on employment.” 
3. Who Earns Minimum Wages in Colombia? 
 
The Colombian law defines the minimum wage as the right of a worker to earn 
enough to cover not only his basic material, moral and cultural needs but also the needs of 
his family.” Such institution was introduced in 1955 and has been updated following 
different criteria such us inflation, productivity, and GDP growth, through a bargaining 
process between government, unions and firms. Its legislature has changed considerably 
with minimum wages varying between rural and urban and also by firm size. Since 1984 it 
was unified as a national wage floor. 
Most of the studies for Colombia have focused on the relationship between 
minimum wages, inflation and employment. Few of them though have looked at 
distributional issues (Maloney and Nuñez, 2001 and Velez and Santamaría, 1999, see also 
Hernández and Lasso, 1999 for a detailed review). The key question with which this paper 
is concerned, however, is not with the wage or employment effects of minimum wages, but   11
rather with whether minimum wages in Colombia achieve the goal of improving living 
standards for low-income families. 
We use quarterly data from the National household surveys (Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares) for the period 1984-2001. The survey covers the 7 largest cities Bogotá, Medellín, 
Cali, Barranquilla, Pasto, Bucaramanga and Manizales and has about 20.000 households 
per quarter. 
We focus on information at the household level. Although the survey has 
information on domestic workers and boarders as part of the family we excluded them and 
only consider family members and relatives. As mentioned by Newmark et al. (2003) this 
might lead to a sample selection bias since a domestic worker´s family living in the 
household of an employer will not be included in the sample. 
We take per-capita income defined as the total family earnings divided by all family 
members whether or not they have any income. We construct proxies for the family´s 
human capital and family composition in order to estimate a sort of household mincerian 
equation. For education we take the maximum level of education among the family 
members above 12 years of age; for experience the maximum age of members participating 
in the labor force; for gender composition the proportion of women among the family 
members; for risk taking behavior the proportion of sef-employed among members above 
12 years of age, and for age composition the proportion of young  (between 12 and 22) 
among family members as well as the proportion of children. 
We use per-capita income based on all monetary earnings (basically labor earnings 
including those of self-employed individuals), discharging other household earnings since 
they seem to have report problems. This is a limitation in the results presented since 
changes in minimum wages might produce changes in public and private transfer payments   12
to the family due to changes in employment, hours and earnings. Since monetary earnings 
are derived from labor contracts, we work with hourly earnings and calculate monthly 
earnings base on hours worked per week.
3 
As for poverty measures we take the poverty line calculated by the Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación (National Planning Department). This measure is estimated by city 
although it does not control for equivalence scales depending on number of individuals and 
their ages. This might be a problem in case the minimum wage changes the structure of the 
family over time.
4 
The period 1984-2001 has been chosen since it is marked by strong movements in 
the minimum wage (Graph 1) including a long downward trend during the 80s and the first 
half of the 90s which reverts during its second half.  
Most of the work is based on cross section data at the family level. The sample 
includes 900,000 households and excludes families with any employed member reporting 
missing earnings and families with no members participating either as employed or 
unemployed. 
 Table 1 shows that 16.7 % of workers working between 30 and 50 hours per week 
earn less than the minimum wage and 7.2 % earn exactly the minimum wage. Bogotá and 
Medellín are the cities with relatively higher wages with less than 11% of workers earning 
below the minimum wage and they also have a higher proportion of individuals earning 
exactly the minimum. As expected, young non-heads workers with none to middle 
education are the ones with a higher percentage earning the minimum. These groups, 
together with women are also more likely to earn wages under the minimum wage. In 
                                                 
3 We also looked at monthly earnings and compare it with our estimates based on hourly earnings finding not 
significant differences between them. 
4 Incomes, minimum wages and poverty lines were deflated using the consumer price index for each city.   13
contrast, household heads, older workers, and individuals with higher education tend to 
have earnings above the minimum wage. Finally, we found that among the workers 
belonging to families in the lower tail of the family per-capita income distribution more 
than 40% earn below the minimum wage and have higher percentage working at a 
minimum compared with families up in the distribution (except for those families at the 
bottom 10%). 
Regarding families, table 2 divides them by low-high income based on the poverty 
line and half the poverty line. Poor families tend to be those with household heads with low 
education, earning less than the minimum, many with self employed household heads, with 
a bigger family size and a lower number of members employed.  
The fact that 70% of workers living in poor households earn the minimum wage or 
less shows an important room for the minimum wage to alter the relative living conditions 
of low income families. However, note that household heads in poor families are over 
represented by individuals working in the self employment sector which limits the impact 
of the minimum wage. 
3.1.  Identifying the Minimum Wage Effect 
 
We use the econometric strategy followed by Neumark, Cunninham and Siga 
(2003) for Brazil but taking advantage of a much longer span of time and variation in the 
minimum wage legislation offered by the Colombian case within a relatively more stable 
macroeconomic environment than in the Brazilian economy.
5  
                                                 
5 This is why they limited their analysis to the 1996-2001 post-hyperinflationary period.    14
The main problem faced with the data at hand is that the minimum wage is set at a 
national level and there is no variation by economic sector or region. We would like to have 
a proxy that capture both time series and cross sectional variation on the “bite” of the 
minimum wage.  
As graph 1 shows, the minimum wage decreased during most of the 80s and early 
90s suggesting an easing of the minimum wage constraint in the labor market that was 
reverted toward the end of the 90s. During the same period income inequality both at the 
family and the individual level (Graph 2) showed a slightly declining trend  between 1984 
and 1995, after which inequality seems to worsen for the bottom part of the distribution 
showing a final stable but higher level at the end of the 90s. Hence, one could argue that 
lower rather than higher levels of minimum wages reduce income inequality.  
Nevertheless, as graph 3 shows, the fraction of individuals earning just the 
minimum increases almost continuously between 1984 and 1995 year in which this fraction 
drops to the 80s and remains like that for the rest of the decade. In particular, the 
accelerated increase during the first part of the 90s coincides with strong growths in the 
construction sector which may partially account for this trend.
6 Therefore, it is hard to 
assess, from simple inspection, the relation between minimum wage and inequality. 
Neumark et al. (2003) suggests a way to capture the minimum wage effect by 
looking at the fraction of workers that most probably will hold a contract associated with 
the new minimum wage.  This group are, ideally, those whose wage is between the old and 
the new minimum wage so they are the ones for whom an increase in the minimum wage 
should also lead to an increase in their wages (since their employers were paying them at or 
above the minimum before, they are likely to pay them at or above the new minimum wage 
                                                 
6 It could also indicate an inverse relationship between the minimum wage compliance and its level.   15
or lay them off). We calculated the fraction of workers between the current real minimum 
wage and the minimum wage 12 months before (FBM) for each city-survey cell. Graph 4 
shows a 7-cities average of this fraction. Negative (positive) values mean a reduction 
(increase) in the “bite”. The graph shows not only that the “bite” has suffered strong 
changes during the sample period but also that there is significant variation between cities. 
Both time-series and cross-sectional variation in FBM will be used to better identify how 
minimum wages affect the distribution of incomes.
 7 
We also used a standard real minimum wage to median income ratio to see the 
robustness of our estimates (RMM). Analogous to taxation the fraction, FBM, will measure 
changes in the base whereas the minimum median ratio, RMM, will measure changes in the 
tax rate (Graphs 5 and 6). 
4.  Unemployment and Participation at the Household 
Level 
 
The minimum wage effects are the result of offsetting forces: for those with a net 
gain the income effect more than offset the negative impact that the minimum wage may 
have in other labor dimensions at the family level such as unemployment and hours worked 
by its members. Following Newmark et al. (2003) we looked at both household heads and 
the family group as a whole to explore the family profile of those affected by changes in the 
minimum wage. 
We estimate different features of the labor choices and labor outcomes experienced 
by the family controlling for family’s human capital and family composition as explained 
in section 3. For household heads we looked at the probability of being employed (salaried 
                                                 
7 We took real rather than nominal wages since we believe the erosion of the minimum wage within a year 
due to inflation does relive its binding constraint for contracts spread over the calendar year.   16
or self-employed), and hours worked. For Non-head members we look at hours worked as 
well as their unemployment and participation rate. The estimations are based on a pooled 
sample of all cross sections from the quarterly ENH surveys in the period 1984-2001. We 
model each labor variable  j y  for the  j -individual (family) as a mincerian relation where: 
j c q a j j jt jt jt jt j D D D Z X MB MB MB MB y ε β β β β α + + + + + + + + + + = − − − 1 4 2 / 1 3 4 / 1 2 1 ,  (1) 
where  1 2 / 1 4 / 1 , , , − − − jt jt jt jt MB MB MB MB  are the current minimum wage median income ratio, 
the ratio a quarter before, the ratio 6 months before and the ratio a year before;  j X  is a set 
of human capital variables and  j Z  is a set of individual (family) characteristics, this two 
sets defined as in section 3; and finally c q a D D D , ,  are annual, quarter (1st, 2nd, 3th, 4th 
quarter) and city dummies. 
As shown in table 3, a mayor finding is that increases in the minimum wage to 
median income ratio, RMM,
8  increase the likelihood of a household head being 
unemployed, the main effect occurring in the first quarter. The interactions of RMM and 
gender, age and education also showed up significant, indicating that the negative effect is 
larger for women, young people and less educated people. These last findings give 
robustness to the results given that these groups have a larger proportion of individuals 
earning around the minimum.   Table 3 also shows that the minimum wage bite additionally 
reduces the number of hours worked by household heads although the effect differs 
significantly only by age. 
                                                 
8 We can not use FBM here since it is a measure of a “change” in the minimum wage bite calculated as in 
footnote 10. Using fractions below the minimum wage is not a straight forward measure of the minimum 
wage bite: a high fraction may indicate a strong bite although it may indicate low compliance as is evident 
from table 1.    17
Table 4, on the other hand, looks at the behavior of members other than the household 
head. We estimate equation (1) for hours worked by non-heads and use binomial models to 
look at the determinants of their unemployment rate and their participation rate using 
family level data. The binomial household unemployment model is a binomial model of the 
number of non-head unemployed members giving the number of household members 
participating in the labor force; the binomial participation model looks at the number of 
members employed or searching conditional on the number of members above 12 years of 
age.
9 
Clearly, the RMM is inversely related with hours worked by non-heads and positively 
related with their unemployment and their participation rates. Most of the effect on the 
unemployment rate depends on the household education level; the higher it is the higher the 
increase in the unemployment rate as a result of an increase in RMM. Note also, the change 
in the sign of the education coefficient once the interaction is included highlighting the 
distorting effect of the minimum wage in the unemployment equation.  As for their 
participation in the labor market, higher RMM increases participation especially of those 
families with lower education as is captured by the interaction of RMM and education as a 
proxy for family’s human capital; note also a large bias in the education coefficient when 
omitting the interaction term. 
The effect of minimum wages on non-head family members will capture not only 
demand side (higher costs for the firms), but also supply side effects. This is the case for 
hours worked and unemployment. In the first case, we adventure the hypothesis that the 
                                                 
9 The binomial model depicts the number of successful events, x , in n trials where  n x ≤ ≤ 0 , 
np x E = ) (  and  n p p x V ) 1 ( ) ( − = . In our case, x is the number of family members unemployed 
(participating in the labor force) and n the number of members participating in the labor force (members 
older than 12).   18
reduction in hours worked by non-heads is a demand side effect since the other results 
indicate that the pervasive effects of the minimum wage specially for the poorer, lower 
human capital families, should increase their labor supply ( as is confirm by the 
participation model).   
Also, the rate of unemployment may increase with raises in the minimum wage via 
labor demand, labor supply or search factors. The finding that most of the negative 
employment effect in non-head members is related to the family’s human capital is 
consistent with labor decisions that go beyond the individual and are associated with what 
is going on in the family group as a whole. Clearly, increases in the minimum wage would 
increase the reservation wage for every body looking for a job. However, as we saw in table 
8 the lower the household head’s human capital the higher the negative effect of increases 
in the minimum wage on his/her probability of being employed. Therefore, those non-heads 
leaving in a high human capital group will be more prone to wait for a job in the covered 
sector and, therefore, experience longer spells of unemployment whereas those in low 
human capital families will have to accept employment in the uncovered-spot sector to 
offset the family’s unemployment shocks due to changes in the minimum wage.  
5. Net Income effects 
 
The significant negative effect of the minimum wage on employment and its 
positive effect on the family’s participation rate clearly show that in the Colombian case 
higher minimum wages induce higher unemployment rates. In this section we test whether 
the negative employment effects are offset by the income effects that the minimum may 
have on those that remain employed and on those new comers attracted by a higher search 
payoff. This is done by looking at the per-capita family income which will sum up both the   19
zero incomes for the unemployed and the higher incomes induced by the minimum wage 
for those employed. 
We use both proxies, FBM and FMM, to estimate dynamic panel models for each of 
the different percentiles of the distribution of incomes. We perform a set of estimations 
both for family per-capita incomes and for worker labor incomes base on annual 
observations taken from first quarter surveys. For both proxies of the minimum wage bite 
(MB) we estimate: 




jt MB y y ε λ µ β η α + + + + + = −1    (2). 
Where
c
jt y  is the income at the 
th c percentile of the income distribution (per-capita 
family income and individual income distributions calculated from salaried and self-
employed workers) in city  j  in year t,  jt MB  is a proxy of the minimum wage bite for each 
city-quarter pair,  j µ  is a city unobservable effect and  t λ  is a time specific effect, invariant 
across cities.
10 In (2) β  will be the short run effect whereas  ) 1 /( η β −  will be the long run 
effect. 
We estimate equation (2) following Anderson and Hsiao (1982) differences 
estimator but, since we are working with panels characterized by small n(seven cities) and 
quite large T (16 observations) we followed the strategy suggested by Robertson y Symons 
(1992). First we tested for panel unit roots for both the dependent and the independent 
variables using Hadri and Larsson (2001).
11 We did not reject the null of unit root for any 
                                                 
10 We also introduced interactions of the minimum wage with dummies for first quarter after introducing 
legislative changes in the minimum wage in all the models estimated in the paper. We found significant 
positive effects of minimum wage changes in family incomes in most regressions. However, we choose to 
present a more parsimonious specification to facilitate interpretation. The results do not differ from those 
presented here. 
11 Note that the fraction between the current and the past minimum wage is a “change” in the minimum wage 
“bite” which is the difference in the fractions of workers below the current and the past minimum wage 12   20
of the variables used in our estimation. In such cases, Robertson et Al.(1992) show that 
Arellano and Bond (1991) instrumental variables estimator does not work well since lags of 
the dependent variable in levels will be no correlated with the lags of the dependent 
variable in differences. They then suggest using lags of the exogenous variables in 
differences as instruments and so we use lags of the minimum wage bite proxies defined 
above.  
Table 5 shows percentile estimates based on equation (2) for per capital family 
income distributions. It includes short and long run effects as specified in (2). Note that by 
estimating (2) in differences we get rid of the city effect but not the time effect so we 
include time dummies.  The table shows significant positive effects for percentiles above 
25
th using FBM on each percentile, both in the short and in the long run, and above 15
th 
using RMM but not statistically significant effects at the bottom of the distribution. The 
parameter estimates also suggest an inverted U shape: the gains being close to zero at the 
bottom of the distribution (percentiles up to the 20
th), highest at the middle (percentiles 
between 25
th and 45
th) and lower at the top (percentiles from 50
th to 90
th) which is coherent 
with minimum wage earners being relatively more representative in families between the 
20
th and 50
th percentiles (table 1). 
On the other hand, worker labor income percentile regressions are reported in table 
6. Significant effects were found toward the middle of the distribution using FBM. Most of 
the income gains are concentrated between the 45
th and 60
th with no significant effects at 
the bottom and the top. With FMM the gains start at a lower percentile (30
th) and are 
significant all the way up in the distribution, being higher around the middle both in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
months before.  That is, the fraction of individuals whose income 12 months before was below the current 
minimum wage minus the fraction of them with incomes below the minimum 12 months before. These are the 
variables that were tested for panel unit roots.  The tests are available on request.   21
short and in the long run. However, no statistically significant effect was found for 
percentiles lower than 25




5.1. Distributive  Effects 
Apparently we would think that from the income estimates presented above, a more 
binding minimum wage will increase inequality at the lower part of the distributions, 
increasing the gap between the percentiles below the median, and will reduce inequality at 
the upper part of the distribution of both families and individuals. Yet, it will not alleviate 
the situation of those families at the bottom and may worsen workers below the minimum.  
However, as we can not tell how different the effects between percentiles we can 
not assess the statistical significance of the distributive effects of the minimum wage. To 
gauge on this, we estimate the difference between each percentile and the median percentile 
both for family per-capita incomes and individual labor incomes. Following equation (2) 
and subtracting 
c
jt y  from 
5 . 0
jt y  for any 
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5 . 0 ) ( ) ( ,         (3’) 
where  k  is a proportional factor that allows us to rewrite (3) in terms of the lagged 
difference in the percentile distance and estimate (3’) combining Anderson and Shiao 
(1982) and Robertson y Symons (1992) using lagged differences in our proxies for the 
minimum wage bite FBM and RMM as instruments for the lagged differences in the 
percentile incomes 
5 . 0
1 − ∆ jt y  and 
c
jt y 1 − ∆ . Equation (3’) allows us to test whether 0
5 . 0 ≠ −
c β β .   22
Table 7 shows the results for the distribution of per-capita family incomes. Neither 
FBM nor RMM reflects any changes in distances to the median in the short run (except for 
an almost significant increase in the distance of the 15
th percentile to the median) 
confirming how similar the estimates for the short term effect are across percentiles in table 
5. Therefore, if any distributional effect can be attributed to minimum wages, it will be a 
long run effect associated with differences in the speed of adjustment of each percentile 
income to shocks as the long run effects in table 5 suggest. 
To explore this hypothesis we followed a different econometric strategy by 
estimating a long run relationship based on annual data of the form: 
jt t j jt jt jt jt
c
jt MB MB MB MB y ε λ µ β β β β α + + + + + + + = − − − 1 4 2 / 1 3 4 / 1 2 1      (4) 
and for the percentile difference to the median (and the 70
th percentile): 
c
jt jt jt jt jt jt d
c
jt jt MB MB MB MB y y ε ε β β β β α − + + + + + = − − − −
5 . 0
1 4 2 / 1 3 4 / 1 2 1
5 . 0 ,   (5) 
where  1 2 / 1 4 / 1 , , , − − − jt jt jt jt MB MB MB MB  are the current minimum wage median income ratio, 
the ratio a quarter before, the ratio 6 months before and the ratio a year before. Here the log 
run effect will be the addition of the  i β  coefficients. We take random effects whenever the 
Houseman test for consistency is passed (see appendix 1). Equations (4) and (5) are non-
dynamic versions of (2) and (3’) for the per-capita family incomes whose results are shown 
in Graph 7 (estimations in appendix A).
12 The dark portions of the plots show statistically 
significant minimum wage effects whereas the dotted ones are insignificant. These 
                                                 
12 We run the panel with annual percentile levels. In order to exploit the sample we take each quarter annual 
series for each city as one history and pool all quarter-city histories together for a total of 28 each with 17 




and for the percentile difference to de median (and the 70
th percentile): 
   23
estimates are in line with table 5: the minimum wage has a positive long run effect for all 
percentiles above 25
th which are quite the same across percentiles, and has no significant, if 
not a negative effect, at the bottom of the per-capita family income distribution. Clearly it 
does not change the shape of the distribution above the 20
th percentile (25
th  for distances to 
the 70
th percentile) since its long run effect on distances to de median (70
th percentile) are 
not significant. However it does increase the gap between the bottom percentiles and the 
median and the 70
th percentiles respectively. 
Finally, table 8 shows the results of (3’) for the distribution of individual incomes.  
Both proxies coincide in identifying an increase in the gap between the median individual 
income and all the percentiles below it and a reduction in the gap for percentiles around the 
median and above. 
How badly the minimum wage may hurt those families at the very bottom of the 
distribution could not be unveil with the panel data techniques since there are many cero 
per-capita incomes at percentiles below the 10
th. We attempt to measure it by looking at the 
likelihood of being poor/non-poor by looking at households with per- capita incomes below 
half and 1/3 of the poverty line. Here again, we used the pooled sample of all the quarterly 
surveys for the period 1984-2001 and run a mincerian family equation controlling for 
household human capital and composition as was discussed in section 3.  Table 9 shows 
that an increase in the minimum wage to the median income ratio, RMM,
13 raises the 
likelihood of being poor. All the other variables have the expected sign. Furthermore, the 
effect is significantly smaller for those families with higher human capital.  
Summarizing, per-capita income estimates suggest that the minimum wage changes 
during the period 1984-2001 produced important asymmetric effects in the household 
                                                 
13 See note 8.   24
income distribution bringing important gains for families well above the bottom of the 




In this study we concentrate on evaluating the effects of the minimum wage on 
family’s well being and on establishing the robustness of the results by looking at the 
minimum wage effect on head and non-head members.  
We find important gains for families in the middle and the upper part of the 
distribution of family per-capita incomes but none to significantly negative effects for 
families at the bottom. This creates important distributive effects, increasing the gap 
between those at the bottom and those up in the per-capita family distribution. 
At the individual level, there is a clear “spill over” effect with income gains not only 
for individuals at percentiles close to the minimum but further up in the individual income 
distribution. However there is no evidence of a “farol” effect since there are not significant 
positive effects for individuals at the bottom and there is clear evidence that it increases the 
probability of unemployment especially for low human capital workers. These results show 
an asymmetric effect which end up deteriorating the situation of those that the minimum 
wage is suppose to alleviate. 
Beyond the income effects on households, the minimum wage clearly distorts other 
dimensions of the family’s labor profile. For families with lower human capital, an increase 
in the minimum wage increases non-head participation (maybe a third-bread-giver response 
to negative family income shocks) and does not change the unemployment rate 
significantly, although will lower the hours worked. In contrast, for families with high   25
human capital the participation effect is much lower with increases in their unemployment 
rate (probably a search-reservation wage effect inducing longer unemployment spells). 
It should be left clear that these results are based on labor incomes and therefore 
nothing can be inferred about whether the net income gains driven by raises in the 
minimum wage for families relatively high in the distribution are produced at the expense 
of losses at the bottom. It maybe possible that the Colombian employers have had enough 
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Graph 1: Real Minimum Wage 1984 -2001


























































































































































Graph 2: Family Per-capita Income inequality and Worker Wage 
Inequality
Worker Wages Inequality
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Family Per capital Income Inequality 

























































































































Family Per capital Income Inequality 
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Graph 3: Workers Earning near the Minimum
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Graph 4: Fraction of Workers Between the Current Minimum and the Minimum 12 months Before
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Graph 7: Long Run Minimum Wage Effects on Family Per-capita Income Distribution 
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See appendix A for the regression details.  32
Table 1: Worker Characteristics of those working between 30 and 50 hours a week
N <SMM =SMM >SMM
All 214,969 16.70 7.21 76.08
By cities
B/Quilla 28,677 14.59 7.72 77.69
B/Manga 20,631 17.70 6.46 75.84
Bogotá 27,449 9.31 10.72 79.97
Manizales 23,979 17.59 5.27 77.14
Medellín 34,984 10.44 8.30 81.26
Calí 21,796 15.89 8.48 75.63
Pasto 20,991 29.39 3.70 66.91
Demografic groups
Men 114,726 15.10 7.22 77.68
Women 100,243 18.54 7.21 74.25
Head 90,767 10.70 6.36 82.94
Conyugue 39,113 17.92 6.03 76.05
Single son/dauter 51,160 23.57 8.23 68.20
Widow/divorsed 12,396 17.96 9.16 72.88
Other relatives 20,852 22.91 9.42 67.67
Pensioned 524 12.02 10.11 77.86
12-19 ages 12,736 55.77 8.41 35.82
20-34 ages 106,935 15.60 8.39 76.01
35-49 ages 74,771 11.75 5.94 82.32
>50  ages 20,527 16.23 5.00 78.76
No education 2,322 57.92 7.71 34.37
1-5 years of education 39,866 35.87 10.30 53.84
6-11 years of education 112,526 16.58 9.05 74.36
12-17 years of education 54,546 2.71 1.77 95.53
>17 years of education 5,292 0.64 0.13 99.23
Sector
Worker without pay 3,544 99.86 0.00 0.14
Salaried worker 211,425 15.31 7.33 77.36
Percentile family per-capita income
0.1 1,911 86.55 4.66 8.79
0.2 8,858 60.18 11.82 28.00
0.3 13,637 40.33 13.18 46.49
0.4 17,649 29.85 12.92 57.23
0.5 21,420 23.75 10.92 65.32
0.6 24,845 18.76 10.22 71.02
0.7 28,563 13.79 7.92 78.29
>.7 98,086 4.55 3.21 92.23 33
 
 
Table 2: Family characteristics given poor/non-poor
With labor income (include self-employed)
N Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor
All 295,945 35.18 64.82 66.12 33.88
By city
B/Quilla 40,697 33.1 66.9 66.7 33.3
B/Manga 28,780 40.5 59.5 72.0 28.0
Bogotá 33,362 40.8 59.2 69.0 31.0
Manizales 32,624 37.7 62.3 67.7 32.3
Medellín 41,029 34.0 66.0 64.8 35.2
Calí 32,071 32.7 67.3 63.4 36.6
Pasto 27,968 38.2 61.8 67.6 32.4
Household head
Men 214,468 36.5 63.5 68.4 31.6
Women 81,477 31.8 68.3 60.1 39.9
No education 2,009 21.9 78.1 48.7 51.3
1-5 years of education 39,997 20.7 79.3 50.9 49.1
6-11 years of education 191,328 29.8 70.2 64.2 35.8
12-17 years of education 59,965 60.8 39.2 82.2 17.8
>17 years of education 2,632 76.7 23.3 87.3 12.7
Employed 223,772 40.0 60.0 73.4 26.6
Employed with real wage less than minimum 100,138 17.1 82.9 50.5 49.7
Worker without pay 461 21.7 78.3 50.3 49.7
Salaried 119,196 46.3 53.7 80.5 19.5
Self-employed 98,898 33.5 66.5 66.0 34.0
Hosehold head median income … 361402.2 198422.7 276497.7 142633.3
Average % head incomes in total … 69.2 80.8 72.7 85.7
Average hours of work if employed … 215.1 222.4 219.5 219.5
Average number of family members … 3.8 4.6 4.1 4.7
Characteristics excluding head
Average employed … 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.5
Average hours worked … 166.0 107.0 149.9 77.6
with poverty line with 1/2 of poverty line
  34
Table 3:  Household Head Hours Worked and Probability of Being Employed
Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val
Ratio minimum wage to median 
individual income=RMM -0.378 0.029 -1.12 0.01 0.0232 0.425 -0.214 0.01
(0.173) (0.442) (0.029) (0.079)
RMM(t-1) -0.135 0.394 -0.214 0.68 -0.0467 0.047 -0.108 0.18
(0.159) (0.526) (0.023) (0.080)
RMM(t-2) -0.008 0.957 -0.489 0.37 0.0366 0.239 -0.019 0.83
(0.158) (0.548) (0.031) (0.089)
RMM(t-3) -0.096 0.558 -0.26 0.57 -0.0716 0.007 0.062 0.42
(0.164) (0.452) (0.026) (0.077)
RMM total efect -0.617 0.00 -2.083 0.00 -0.058 0.05 -0.279 0.00
Age  0.033 0.00 0.022 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.005 0.00
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)
Age^2 -0.0005 0.00 -0.0005 0.00 -0.0001 0.00 -0.0001 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (Male=1) 0.332 0.00 -0.218 0.07 0.185 0.00 0.145 0.00
(0.009) (0.120) (0.003) (0.029)
Education 0.019 0.00 -0.011 0.34 -0.006 0.00 -0.004 0.07
(0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002)
Self-employed 3.301 0.00 3.483 0.03 -0.087 0.00 -0.124 0.00
(0.158) (1.625) (0.002) (0.030)
Interaction of RMM with 
Education a/ 0.038 0.01 -0.003 0.39
Interaction of RMM with Age a/ 0.015 0.01 0.004 0.00
Interaction of RMM with Gender 
a/ 0.721 0.00 0.053 0.16
Interaction of RMM with Self 
employed a/ -0.147 0.95 0.049 0.21
Year Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quarter Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
City Dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shap-Francia 0.50 0.50
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.00 0.00
Employment Probability Hours Worked 
 
a/ Is the sum of the short run coefficients.   35
Table 4:  Household Employment, participantion and Hours Worked by Non Head Members
Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val
Ratio minimum wage to median 
individual income=RMM -0.060 0.15 -0.171 0.06 0.559 0.00 0.075 0.70 0.002 0.96 -0.003 0.98
(0.042) (0.090) (0.073) (0.196) (0.040) (0.103)
RMM(t-1) -0.061 0.11 -0.152 0.10 0.206 0.00 0.405 0.05 -0.022 0.58 0.146 0.19
(0.038) (0.092) (0.072) (0.210) (0.040) (0.110)
RMM(t-2) 0.036 0.36 0.139 0.12 -0.316 0.00 -0.571 0.01 -0.104 0.01 -0.161 0.14
(0.039) (0.089) (0.074) (0.209) (0.041) (0.110)
RMM(t-3) -0.092 0.02 -0.033 0.69 0.356 0.00 0.138 0.47 0.075 0.06 0.465 0.00
(0.039) (0.082) (0.073) (0.191) (0.040) (0.100)
RMM total efect -0.177 0.00 -0.217 0.00 0.806 0.00 0.046 0.78 -0.049 0.30 0.447 0.00
Interaction of RMM with human 
capital (hksm)
HKRMM 0.011 0.12 0.046 0.01 0.001 0.89
(0.007) (0.018) (0.009)
HKRMM-1 0.009 0.23 -0.020 0.30 -0.017 0.10
(0.007) (0.019) (0.010)
HKRMM-2 -0.010 0.15 0.025 0.19 0.006 0.55
(0.007) (0.019) (0.010)
HKRMM-3 -0.006 0.36 0.020 0.24 -0.038 0.00
(0.006) (0.017) (0.009)
HKRMM marginal effect 0.004 0.40 0.071 0.00 -0.047 0.00
Education -0.005 0.00 -0.008 0.02 0.020 0.00 -0.035 0.00 0.027 0.00 0.063 0.00
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.005)
Prop. Women -0.043 0.00 -0.043 0.00 0.069 0.00 0.070 0.00 -0.137 0.00 -0.137 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.014 0.00 0.014 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prop. Self-employed -0.343 0.00 -0.343 0.00 -1.945 0.00 -1.945 0.00 0.598 0.00 0.597 0.00
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
Prop. Young under 22 -0.077 0.00 -0.077 0.00 0.564 0.00 0.563 0.00 -0.418 0.00 -0.417 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Prop. Children -0.137 0.00 -0.137 0.00 -0.734 0.00 -0.734 0.00 -0.982 0.00 -0.982 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Year Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quarter Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
City Dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shap-Francia 0.50 0.50
Household  Unemployment 
Number conditional on family 
members in the labor force 
(Binomial Model)
Household Participation 
Number conditional on family 
members above 12 years of 
age( Binomial Model)




Table 5: Family per capita centile income regressions using two proxies for minimum wage bite
Households
Fraction of workers between current and past minimum wages (=Fraction)
P.10 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.5 P.6 P.7 P.8 P.9
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Lagged per-capita income 0.732  0.00 0.730  0.00 0.688  0.00 0.693  0.00 0.727  0.00 0.708  0.00 0.710  0.00 0.709  0.00 0.710  0.00 0.681  0.00 0.654  0.00 0.603  0.00 0.534  0.00
(0.102) (0.102) (0.069) (0.050) (0.028) (0.047) (0.038) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.043) (0.051) (0.078)
Fraction (FMB) 0.019 - 0.89 0.037  0.61 0.052  0.34 0.081  0.05 0.087  0.00 0.099  0.00 0.085  0.01 0.097  0.00 0.092  0.00 0.090  0.01 0.089  0.01 0.083  0.02 0.041  0.34
(0.141) (0.071) (0.054) (0.040) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.043)
Long run effect 0.070 - 0.89 0.136  0.64 0.165  0.31 0.263  0.02 0.319  0.00 0.340  0.00 0.294  0.00 0.332  0.00 0.318  0.00 0.281  0.00 0.257  0.00 0.210  0.00 0.088  0.33
Sargan test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
test first autocorr. 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
test second autocorr. 0.57 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.72 0.77 0.64 0.91 0.93 0.62 0.27 0.96
Change in the minimum-wage/median-income ratio (=Fraction)
P.10 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.5 P.6 P.7 P.8 P.9
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Lagged per-capita income 0.717  0.00 0.736  0.00 0.706  0.00 0.711  0.00 0.743  0.00 0.721  0.00 0.712  0.00 0.703  0.00 0.701  0.00 0.659  0.00 0.623  0.00 0.564  0.00 0.515  0.00
(0.106) (0.104) (0.067) (0.049) (0.024) (0.040) (0.027) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.056) (0.100)
Fraction (RMM) 0.327  0.24 0.227  0.17 0.476  0.01 0.611  0.00 0.601  0.00 0.693  0.00 0.660  0.00 0.747  0.00 0.657  0.00 0.699  0.00 0.746  0.00 0.685  0.00 0.487  0.00
(0.279) (0.165) (0.188) (0.154) (0.122) (0.123) (0.117) (0.127) (0.130) (0.135) (0.100) (0.106) (0.089)
Long run effect 1.155  0.32 0.858  0.24 1.621  0.00 2.112  0.00 2.338  0.00 2.485  0.00 2.288  0.00 2.517  0.00 2.197  0.00 2.050  0.00 1.978  0.00 1.569  0.00 1.003  0.00
Sargan test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
test first autocorr. 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02




Table 6: Individual wage centile regressions
Workers
Fraction of workers between current and past minimum wages (=Fraction)
P.10 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.5 P.6 P.7 P.8 P.9
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v P-v Coef
Lagged per-capita income 0.723  0.00 0.810  0.00 0.776  0.00 0.746  0.00 0.634  0.00 0.648  0.00 0.597  0.00 0.639  0.00 0.581  0.00 0.572  0.00 0.533  0.00 0.503  0.00 0.481  0.00
(0.063) (0.118) (0.085) (0.075) (0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.066) (0.107) (0.066) (0.047) (0.058)
Fraction (FMB) 0.012 - 0.88 0.017 - 0.72 0.019  0.69 0.025  0.52 0.022  0.68 0.051  0.42 0.082  0.20 0.102  0.03 0.098  0.03 0.058  0.01 0.017  0.55 0.034  0.36 0.016  0.67
(0.077) (0.047) (0.005) (0.052) (0.064) (0.063) (0.047) (0.044) (0.023) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038)
Long run effect 0.044 - 0.87 0.087 - 0.70 0.083  0.71 0.097  0.55 0.060  0.68 0.146  0.40 0.203  0.19 0.282  0.01 0.233  0.00 0.136  0.02 0.037  0.55 0.069  0.35 0.031  0.67
Sargan test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 1.00
test first autocorr. 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
test second autocorr. 0.74 0.51 0.72 0.32 0.83 0.15 0.72 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.04 0.67
Change in the minimum-wage/median-income ratio (=Fraction)
P.10 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.5 P.6 P.7 P.8 P.9
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v P-v Coef P-v Coef
Lagged per-capita income 0.722  0.00 0.807  0.00 0.764  0.00 0.739  0.00 0.627  0.00 0.627  0.00 0.553  0.00 0.558  0.00 0.493  0.00 0.547  0.00 0.509  0.00 0.682  0.00 0.467  0.00
(0.063) (0.090) (0.122) (0.117) (0.076) (0.027) (0.047) (0.042) (0.083) (0.098) (0.070) (0.057) (0.065)
Fraction (RMM) 0.070 - 0.80 0.241 - 0.35 0.045 - 0.79 0.044  0.55 0.278  0.08 0.342  0.02 0.626  0.04 0.794  0.00 0.789  0.01 0.379  0.00 0.281  0.00 0.335  0.05 0.233  0.08
(0.278) (0.256) (0.174) (0.074) (0.158) (0.143) (0.305) (0.277) (0.295) (0.105) (0.087) (0.168) (0.132)
Long run effect 0.253 - 0.79 1.244 - 0.14 0.248 - 0.78 0.202  0.58 0.745  0.14 0.916  0.03 1.402  0.04 1.799  0.00 1.557  0.00 0.837  0.02 0.572  0.00 1.053  0.04 0.436  0.07
Sargan test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
test first autocorr. 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03





Table 7: Centile distance to the median of family percapita incomes and minimum wage bite
Households
Percentile distance from the median
Fraction of workers between current and past minimum wages (=Fraction)
PERCENTIL P.1 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.37 P.40 P.45 P.60 P.75 P.80 P.90
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Difference (-1) 0.760  0.00 0.806  0.00 0.735  0.00 0.669  0.00 0.579  0.00 0.462  0.00 0.303  0.00 0.217  0.00 0.135  0.00 0.279  0.01 0.430  0.00 0.575  0.00
(0.050) (0.046) (0.030) (0.023) (0.038) (0.070) (0.096) (0.073) (0.045) (0.101) (0.075) (0.045)
Fraction (FMB) 0.049  0.74 0.018  0.70 0.014  0.59 0.001 - 0.97 0.014 - 0.30 0.010 - 0.40 0.003 - 0.75 0.024 - 0.02 0.015  0.20 0.007  0.81 0.007  0.81 0.040 - 0.31
(0.146) (0.045) (0.026) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.026) (0.027) (0.039)
Sargan test 0.82 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
test first autocorr. 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
test second autocorr 0.18 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.83 0.42 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.59 0.55 0.48
Fraction of workers between current and past minimum wages (=Fraction)
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Difference (-1) 0.752  0.00 0.795  0.00 0.732  0.00 0.667  0.00 0.577  0.00 0.456  0.00 0.299  0.00 0.214  0.00 0.141  0.00 0.272  0.00 0.432  0.00 0.570  0.00
(0.048) (0.042) (0.029) (0.019) (0.037) (0.067) (0.098) (0.075) (0.049) (0.080) (0.065) (0.049)
Fraction (RMM) 0.331  0.39 0.170  0.14 0.066  0.30 0.008  0.85 0.036 - 0.35 0.031 - 0.33 0.031 - 0.34 0.107 - 0.00 0.061  0.21 0.102  0.44 0.017  0.89 0.100 - 0.69
(0.384) (0.115) (0.063) (0.042) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.049) (0.131) (0.126) (0.251)
Sargan test 0.81 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
test first autocorr. 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02





Table 8:  Centile distance to the median of individual income and minimum wage bite
Workers
Percentile distance from the median
Fraction of workers between current and past minimum wages (=Fraction)
PERCENTIL P.1 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.60 P.70 P.80 p.90
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Difference (-1) 0.917  0.00 0.917  0.00 0.883  0.00 0.831  0.00 0.801  0.00 0.719  0.00 0.554  0.00 0.047  0.79 0.455  0.00 0.438  0.00 0.458  0.00 0.464  0.00
(0.032) (0.050) (0.062) (0.069) (0.081) (0.092) (0.103) (0.176) (0.056) (0.081) (0.077) (0.057)
Fraction (FMB) 0.017  0.86 0.002 - 0.98 0.019  0.63 0.067  0.07 0.067  0.05 0.060  0.07 0.039  0.17 0.013 - 0.71 0.064 - 0.01 0.165 - 0.01 0.176 - 0.00 0.129 - 0.01
(0.093) (0.059) (0.040) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.023) (0.063) (0.060) (0.053)
Wald test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sargan test 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
t e s t  f i r s t  a u t i ¿ o c o r r 0 . 0 30 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 0 70 . 0 20 . 0 20 . 0 4
t e s t  s e c o n d  a u t o c o r r 0 . 4 60 . 9 40 . 3 90 . 4 00 . 5 30 . 6 10 . 6 90 . 1 60 . 5 90 . 4 40 . 1 80 . 1 3
Change in the minimum-wage/median-income ratio (=Fraction)
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
Difference (-1) 0.916  0.00 0.931  0.00 0.886  0.00 0.824  0.00 0.796  0.00 0.714  0.00 0.545  0.00 0.047  0.77 0.406  0.00 0.421  0.00 0.442  0.00 0.442  0.00
(0.031) (0.051) (0.068) (0.072) (0.089) (0.102) (0.108) (0.156) (0.108) (0.120) (0.088) (0.063)
Fraction (RMM) 0.055  0.86 0.177 - 0.49 0.017  0.93 0.246  0.10 0.233  0.12 0.136  0.42 0.103  0.30 0.073 - 0.51 0.362 - 0.00 0.640 - 0.00 0.623 - 0.00 0.516 - 0.00
(0.313) (0.258) (0.194) (0.151) (0.150) (0.169) (0.098) (0.110) (0.122) (0.115) (0.146) (0.156)
Sargan test 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97
t e s t  f i r s t  a u t i ¿ o c o r r 0 . 0 30 . 0 50 . 0 20 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 0 50 . 0 20 . 0 20 . 0 3
t e s t  s e c o n d  a u t o c o r r 0 . 4 60 . 9 10 . 3 90 . 4 20 . 5 60 . 6 10 . 6 60 . 1 70 . 6 20 . 4 50 . 1 90 . 1 3 40
Table 9: Household likelihood of Being Poor
heteroskedastic probit
Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val Coef P-val
Ratio minimum wage to median 
individual income=RMM 0.074 0.11 -0.169 0.13 0.150 0.00 -0.138 0.25
(0.046) (0.111) (0.052) (0.121)
RMM(t-1) 0.211 0.00 0.376 0.00 0.269 0.00 0.455 0.00
(0.046) (0.118) (0.051) (0.128)
RMM(t-2) 0.010 0.83 0.104 0.38 0.077 0.14 0.315 0.01
(0.047) (0.118) (0.052) (0.128)
RMM(t-3) 0.316 0.00 0.815 0.00 0.342 0.00 0.818 0.00
(0.046) (0.109) (0.052) (0.119)
RMM total efect 0.611 0.00 1.126 0.00 0.838 0.00 1.450 0.00
Interaction of RMM with human 
capital (hksm)
HKRMM 0.027 0.01 0.033 0.01
(0.011) (0.012)
HKRMM-1 -0.018 0.12 -0.021 0.11
(0.012) (0.013)
HKRMM-2 -0.010 0.41 -0.026 0.05
(0.012) (0.013)
HKRMM-3 -0.053 0.00 -0.052 0.00
(0.011) (0.012)
HKRMM marginal effect -0.054 0.00 -0.066 0.00
Education -0.101 0.00 -0.060 0.00 -0.083 0.00 -0.034 0.00
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Prop. Women 0.381 0.00 0.382 0.00 0.457 0.00 0.459 0.00
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Experience -0.006 0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.007 0.00 -0.007 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prop. Self-employed -0.338 0.00 -0.340 0.00 -0.309 0.00 -0.312 0.00
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Prop. Young under 22 0.736 0.00 0.739 0.00 0.565 0.00 0.569 0.00
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Prop. Children 1.408 0.00 1.414 0.00 0.975 0.00 0.982 0.00
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Year Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quarter Dummys 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
City Dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Observations
Likelihood of Being Poor with 
1/2 of poverty line
Likelihood of Being Poor with 
1/3 of poverty line
666,134 666,134 666,134 666,134
   41
Appendix A 
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
RMM Total effect a/ -0.65 0.07 -0.29 0.24 0.08 0.68 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.36 0.04 0.39 0.03 0.48 0.01 0.42 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.52 0.00 0.42 0.02 0.49 0.01 0.43 0.03
Hausman fixed effects vs random effects 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N u m b e r  o f  H i s t o r i e s 2 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 8
Number of observatios 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
RMM Total effect a/ 0.88 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.57 0.04 0.42 -0.02 0.46 -0.01 0.56 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.57
Hausman fixed effects vs random effects 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.98 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
N u m b e r  o f  H i s t o r i e s 2 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 8
Number of observatios 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v Coef P-v
RMM Total effect a/ 1.04 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.51 0.05 0.44 0.07 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.21 -0.01 0.94
Hausman fixed effects vs random effects 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.11 0.88 0.77 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.98 0.36 0.99 1.00
N u m b e r  o f  H i s t o r i e s 2 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 8
Number of observatios 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Family per capita centile income regressions using two proxies for minimum wage bite b/
Centile distance to the median of family percapita incomes and minimum wage bite b/
Centile distance to the 0.7 centile of family percapita incomes and minimum wage bite b/
P.05 P.1 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.37 P.40 P.45 P.50 P.6 P.70 P.80 P.90
P.05 P.1 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.45 P.60 P.70 P.80 P.90
P.05 P.1 P.15 P.20 P.25 P.30 P.35 P.40 P.90 P.45 P.50 P.60 P.80
 
a/ Is the sum of the short run coefficients.  
b/ We run the panel with annual percentile levels. We take each quarter annual series for each city as one history and pool all quarter-city histories together for a total of 28 each with 17 time 
observations. The static model is for the percentile equation: 
jt t j jt jt jt jt
c
jt MB MB MB MB y ε λ µ β β β β α + + + + + + + = − − − 1 4 2 / 1 3 4 / 1 2 1  
and for the percentile difference to the median (and the 70
th percentile). 
c
jt jt jt jt jt jt d
c
jt jt MB MB MB MB y y ε ε β β β β α − + + + + + = − − − −
5 . 0
1 4 2 / 1 3 4 / 1 2 1
5 . 0
 
Where  1 2 / 1 4 / 1 , , , − − − jt jt jt jt MB MB MB MB  are the current minimum wage median income ratio, the ratio a quarter before, the ratio 6 months before and the ratio a year before. 